The International Monetary Fund (hereafter IMF) and its lending programs have been intensely studied by scholars in recent years.
1 Recent scholarship in political science has made four key contributions to this literature -a more focused appraisal of the methodology of selection effects (Edwards 2005; Vreeland 2003; Stone 2002) , a deeper understanding of the role of international political factors in shaping program selection and compliance (Copelovitch 2008; Oatley and Yackee 2004; Stone 2004; Thacker 1999) , an appraisal of how political factors within states shape their ability to implement austerity measures (Nooruddin and Simmons 2006; Pop-Eleches 2008; Stone 2004) , and finally, an improved understanding of the effects of IMF programs on international financial markets (Edwards 2005 (Edwards , 2006 Gould 2003; Jensen 2004; ).
While the above scholarship has focused on the politics and the effects of IMF lending, other roles of the IMF have received less scholarly attention. The Fund was originally created to exercise surveillance over country economies in a world of fixed exchange rates. The Fund's original mandate was to ensure that countries adopted economic policies that were consistent with keeping currencies stable. With the end of the Bretton Woods system, the IMF has continued to perform this surveillance function. This surveillance takes the form of annual meetings with countries (known as Article IV consultations) to ensure that countries are implementing economic and financial policies "toward the objective of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability." 2 While originally envisioned to focus on the exchange rate, the breadth of issues covered in these consultations touch on fiscal and monetary policy, as well as trade policy and structural reforms (Boughton 2001; Pauly 1997 With the onset of the global economic crisis, IMF surveillance of country economies has taken on greater importance. The G-20 London summit endorsed strengthening "candid, evenhanded, and independent" IMF surveillance of member state economies as a means to strengthen the international monetary system. The IMF also has an important role, not only in managing country risks through surveillance, but also in providing know-how. Following its June summit, the G-8 finance ministers tasked the IMF to help member governments by providing the analytical work necessary to make decisions on scaling back the stimulus packages created by countries in response to the crisis.
Recent moves to make Article IV reports transparent make it possible for us to better answer these questions. Following the arrival of the IMF Article IV team on the ground (which takes place approximately every calendar year in both developing countries and developed countries), a report is drafted, which is the document that goes before the IMF's Executive Board. Since
February 2004, the presumption is that this report is made public on the IMF website unless the country blocks publication. As we detail below, the incidence of release of information following the Article IV consultation has increased substantially. The fact that countries seek to suppress publication of these reports in about 20% of the cases, however, tells us something of note. If the skeptics are correct that IMF surveillance is utterly inconsequential, why would countries block publication of the report? Conscious attempts to delimit transparency can only mean that countries seek to limit the impact of the findings of the consultation, and can be interpreted as a sign that these reports actually are influential.
Why is this question important?
IMF surveillance is understudied by scholars relative to lending. Calls for increasing the amount of surveillance demonstrate that this issue is not going away in the near future.
Developing a deeper understanding of when and how surveillance matters is useful for three reasons.
First, it helps us to better understand the effectiveness of the IMF more generally. A better understanding of the sources of its dysfunctions helps contribute to a larger literature on IMF reform. For example, a policy implication of Stone's (2002 Stone's ( , 2004 work is that the presence of geopolitical biases in lending means that the Fund needs to be more independent from G-7
countries. This, in turn, suggests that surveillance is similarly distorted by the prism of great power politics, which has implications for when and how surveillance matters. Fratzscher and Reynaud (2010) find that geopolitical biases affect both the content and the impact of IMF surveillance.
Outside of adding to our knowledge of the IMF and its influence, this project helps advance a larger theoretical concern. Scholars study the IMF because it is one of the most influential international organizations -if countries don't implement the conditions outlined in their austerity programs, access to additional installments of the IMF loan can be suspended. In contrast, there is no direct enforcement by the IMF for failing to heed the advice offered in an Article IV consultation.
While IMF surveillance has taken on greater importance, our knowledge about when IMF surveillance matters is scant. Functional IR theory (also known as neoliberal or neoliberal institutionalism) suggests that surveillance, even when not backed with lending, should be consequential. Information provision is part of the rationale for the IMF's creation in the first place. Investors lack reliable information about the future course of a country's economy, especially in developing countries (Keohane 1984; Rodrik 1995) . Information provision takes on the properties of a public good that can be underprovided, and the countries that contribute this information have incentives to misrepresent it. Empowering the Fund to gather economic information about countries, then, ensures consistency and is a barrier against bias (Abbott and Snidal 1998) . IMF surveillance, then, should be informative to external observers.
For many international organizations, enforcement is not an option. Soft law is an increasingly important regulatory tool in the world economy, yet we lack a theoretical understanding of when and how it matters. 3 For realists, rules such as Article IV are epiphenomenal and merely encapsulate extant preferences rather than alter behavior. For constructivist scholars (Finnemore 1993, Barnett and Finnemore 1996) international organizations have influence even if they have no enforcement power because they have expertise. This allows IOs to socialize states by diffusing norms, but the microfoundations of the socializing or persuading power of international organizations have yet to be fully explicated (Checkel 2001 (Keohane 1984; Rodrik 1995) .
Information provision takes on the properties of a public good that can be underprovided, and the countries that contribute this information have incentives to misrepresent it. Empowering the Fund to gather economic information about countries, then, ensures consistency and is a barrier against bias (Abbott and Snidal 1998 A third issue that this project touches on is the politics of transparency. The strengthening of norms of Article IV transparency is part of a broader policy shift across countries toward greater government openness (Florini 2007) . Understanding when countries make their reports publicly available is part of this broader shift. We answer this question in the pages below using a dataset on every country that underwent an Article IV consultation between 1997 and 2008. We test four alternative explanations for variations in cross-country transparency. We find strong support for a link between regime type and transparency, and some support for economic variables shaping transparency decisions. We find strong evidence for regional contexts in shaping country decisions regarding Article IV transparency, and limited evidence linking IMF lending to IMF transparency.
How has IMF bilateral surveillance changed over time?
Since the end of the Bretton Woods system, IMF surveillance has moved from being a purely private exchange (in which all documents are private between the country and the Fund team) to a largely public exchange in which documents are increasingly released to the public via the IMF website. The initial step in this transformation took place in April 1997, when the IMF's Executive Board allowed the creation of Public Information Notices (PINs). These notices are essentially press releases that contain both factual information as well as the Fund's assessment of the state's economic policies and prospects. PINs can be published by the Fund 5-10 days after the Executive Board's review of the country's consultation, following approval by the member country.
The original concerns about increasing transparency were based on the idea that revealing too much information to markets, specifically about exchange rate policy, would destabilize them (James 1996:274) . After all, a strong public signal from the Fund that a country's exchange rate is unsustainable is likely to produce a run on the currency and force a devaluation. Rather than discuss exchange rates directly, staff reports discussed whether monetary and fiscal policy was largely consistent with the exchange rate policy (Boughton 2001:90) . The Fund moved to allow the release of PINs following country approval, since some countries were already releasing information from the Article IV team's wrap-up meeting with country authorities (Boughton 2001:101 Over time, the norm of making the findings of Article IV consultations public has strengthened. The above discussion, in turn, suggests that it is important to control for the state of the economy. Glennerster and Shin (2008) control for a country's level of debt in their model of data release, but this is not the only possibility here. Levels of trade and financial openness, the sustainability of the current account, and levels of economic growth might all shape country decisions to allow the IMF to release information regarding the Article IV consultation. These variables might move in either direction, as countries might be willing to release data to signal that their economy is performing well despite constraints, or that their economy is outperforming others.
Finally, a growing literature focuses on the international sources of policy change, and it is important to address these claims as well. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2008) argue that four mechanisms --coercion, competition, emulation, and learning-account for the diffusion of policies globally. Certainly in this project, Article IV transparency has emerged as an increasingly strengthening global norm that is part of the IMF's surveillance mission (Pauly 1997) . One way to approach the coercion angle is to look at the extent to which IMF lending has produced changes in transparency. As Mukherjee and Singer (2010) note, it is important to be clear about the casual mechanism linking the IMF to policy change, since leaders can use the program as domestic cover to adopt reforms that they would not have done but for the presence of the IMF program. To infer that conditionality played a direct role in policy change in such a case, therefore, would be a faulty inference.
Policy change need not solely come from the IFIs, indeed it might be shaped by the policy choices of peer countries (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Simmons 2000; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008) . As noted below, regional differences in release rates for both PINs and Article IV staff reports do exist, arguably because the content of each of these reports differ, and these contexts might produce differing incentives for countries to converge or diverge from the "peer standard."
Research Design
What constitutes transparency with respect to a country's Article IV consultation has changed over time. From April 1997 to March 1999, the only option that countries had was whether or not to have the Fund release a PIN following completion of the Executive Board's review of the consultation. From April 1999 on, countries had a second option to release the staff report as well in addition to the PIN.
We've created a cross-national dataset from 1996 to 2008 to help understand the sources of these transparency choices based on including all IMF member countries. The dependent variable is a simple dichotomous coding for the dependent variable (zero-one) for whether or not a PIN or staff report is released as a result of a given consultation. Information on who has or has not released staff reports and PINs is available in the Annual Reports of the IMF as well as its Triennial Reviews of Surveillance and through the IMF website.
We explore the relative influence of four alternative explanations for variations in transparency: democracy, economic factors, regional behavior, and the role of IMF lending. The independent variables are operationalized in the following manner. First, for regime type, we use the POLITY scale lagged one year in which positive values indicate more democratic countries.
We also use a dichotomous measure of democracy taken from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) as a robustness check. It is worth noting that every single finding in this paper regarding the effects of democracy on Article IV transparency holds regardless of measure.
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To these the impact of regional behavior on country decisions to release PINs and staff reports, we first divided countries into regions according to the World Bank's classification scheme. 6 On the basis of this scheme, we calculated the percentage of countries in each region that released PINs or Staff Reports in the previous year.
We test the impact of IMF lending using program data from the IMF's Annual Reports. We include a dummy for whether or not the country was under an IMF program in the previous year, and as an additional robustness check we count the number of years in our data that a country has been under an IMF adjustment program. This second measure is also lagged one year.
Finally, we control for economic variables using data from the World Development We model the release of PINs and staff reports through separate logit models. The use of two discrete logit models to account for what seem to be interconnected decisions makes intuitive sense. While it is true that countries do not release staff reports if they don't release a PIN, sample selection bias does not appear to be a problem here. Since PIN release is practically universal, it is difficult to argue that a selection effect exists in the staff report model. More fundamentally, analyses using heckman logit models suggest that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two equations are independent (or, more to the point, that the correlation between the error terms in the PIN release equation and the staff report release equation was equal to zero).
Thus, the use of separate models for each stage is eminently defensible.
The above discussion of the evolution of transparency regarding IMF surveillance demonstrates that this is a process that has unfolded over time. Our modeling strategy takes this insight to heart, and we test these rival explanations head to head using five empirical tests. In the first, we focus on the decision to release a PIN in the pre-pilot program era. Second, we focus on whether or not PINs are released in the "staff report" era. Third, we study whether or not staff reports are released during the so-called pilot program period. Finally, we study whether or not staff reports are released. Finally, we revisit the staff report model using a dynamic probit model.
In terms of the modeling strategy used in the results that follow, we employed a random effects logit model. Simply put, the use of fixed effects, which would drop out all of the cases in which countries never adopted transparency or always adopted transparency, always resulted in the loss of between 1/3 and ½ of the cases. A random effects model accounts for the countrylevel heterogeneity without the loss of data that fixed effects engender. The cases studied below are time period specific with a goal to understand which independent variables are significant across the time periods. These data are cross-sectionally dominant with a maximum T of nine years. In each of the models, the test for the random effects indicates that it outperforms a pooled model. 8 It should be noted that we discuss inclusion of regional dummies, year dummies and cubic splines for robustness in each section below.
Findings
The first task is to estimate the decision whether or not to release a PIN. To start, we study only the pre-April 1999 period before the development of the Article IV Report Pilot Program.
TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE
As this table suggests, countries that are more democratic are more likely to release PINs compared to their counterparts. The coefficient for the lagged Polity2 score is appropriately signed and significant at a .01 level. Holding all other variables constant, moving the country from a nondemocracy to a fully democratic country increased the probability that it would release a PIN by 55%%.
We also see evidence of a neighborhood effect here as well. The variable for lagged regional PIN release percentage is positive and statistically significant at a .01 level. Holding the other variables constant, changing the regional release percentage from its minimum to its maximum value increases the probability that a country will release a PIN by 53%.
We also see strong evidence of the effects of the economic control variables as well.
Large increases in a country's level of debt service increase the likelihood that countries release their PINs, as this variable is statistically significant at a .05 level. Holding other variables constant, changing the year-on-year change in a country's level of debt service from the minimum to the maximum increases the probability that a country releases a PIN by 81%.
Similarly, a country's annual change in its level of reserves is positively related to PIN release at a .05 level. As a country's level of reserves increases from the minimum to the maximum values, the probability that a country releases a PIN increases by 62%. In this model, debt service is measured as a percentage of exports, and reserves are measured in terms of months of imports. So, countries with high debt/export ratios and high reserves/imports ratios are more transparent. It is worth noting at this point that these are two cross-cutting logics at work here. Countries with increasing debt levels sought to release PINs for reassurance; countries with increasing levels of reserves sought to release PINs to signal financial strength.
It is worth noting that the variable for IMF programs was not statistically significant, nor was lagged GDP per capita. Either as a dummy variable indicated whether the country was under an IMF program in the previous year or as a count of total years under IMF programs did not matter. Moreover, variables for lagged growth and lagged trade/GDP were not significant, nor were variables for the countries' exchange rate and capital account openness. Turning to other issues of robustness, regional dummies were not significant in this equation, nor were temporal dummies for the years 1998 and 1999.
While this model helps us to understand the initial days of the PIN release program, it raises the question of whether the same types of explanations account for the decisions to release PINs for the remainder of the time period for which we have data (from April 1, 1999 to December 31, 2008). As shown below, some of the explanations noted above retain their salience, while others are no longer significant once countries had the additional option to release a staff report. This is shown in the table below.
TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE
As this table suggests, countries that are more democratic are more likely to release PINs compared to their counterparts. The coefficient for the lagged Polity2 score is appropriately signed and significant at a .01 level. Holding all of the other variables constant, moving the country from a nondemocracy to a fully democratic country increased the probability that it would release a PIN by 22%. Thus, the previous finding regarding the effect of democracy on the initial period of PIN release holds up in the analysis of subsequent years.
We also see strong evidence of the effects of the economic control variables as well. While neither the lagged current account balance nor annual change in reserves and debt were statistically significant, in this model lagged GDP per capita and and growth both were.
Wealthier countries are more likely to release PINs, as this variable is statistically significant at a.05 level. Holding other variables constant, changing a country's lagged GDP per capita from the minimum to the maximum increases the probability that a country releases a PIN by 8%.
Similarly, a country's level of growth is positively related to PIN release at a .01 level. As a country's level of growth increases from the minimum to the maximum values, the probability that a country releases a PIN increases by 31%. Comparing these findings to the model for the initial years of PIN release is illustrative. Wealthier countries and those with high levels of growth are more transparent. These countries sought to release PINs not for reassurance, but to signal financial strength.
In contrast to countries can pick and choose to adhere to standards based on internal factors and peer pressure binds less. We return to this argument again in a subsequent section.
As in Table One , we continue to see no evidence that IMF lending shapes decisions about transparency. The variable for whether or not a country was under an IMF program in the previous year was not statistically significant, nor was a count of the total number of years that a country was under IMF adjustment programs. Taken as a whole, we see little evidence that decisions about transparency are shaped by decisions about regarding IMF lending and conditionality.
In terms of robustness checks, this model was reestimated with a set of year dummies to control for the trend, cubic splines to control for duration dependence, and regional dummies to further control for differences in release rates between regions. Taken together, the year dummies were not statistically significant, and the coefficients were unchanged. A set of cubic splines (following Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1997) were statistically significant, indicating duration dependence. 9 While not surprising, the coefficients (in terms of sign and significance) of the main results were unchanged following the addition of the cubic splines. Substantively, the presence of duration dependence tells us that a country's decision to release a PIN at time 1 is shaped by its decision to release or not during the previous consultation. Adding dummies for region did not alter the results -the coefficients presented in Table Two were appropriately signed and statistically significant after controlling for whether the country was in Latin America, East Asia, Middle East/North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, or Europe and Central Asia. The regional dummies themselves were insignificant as a group. In addition, a simple OECD dummy entered into the regression by itself was not significant in this model, nor did it alter the main results.
Finally, we attempted additional tests adding variables for lagged trade/GDP, as well as variables for the countries' exchange rate and capital account openness. In no cases were these additional regressors significant. Moreover, addition of these alternative variables did not alter the main results presented above.
Taken together, then, the picture here suggests an enduring role for democracy as a determinant of transparency. In addition, we also see that countries with stronger economies (as 9 The use of splines rather than year dummies tells a different story about the data, not about its overall trend, but about the effect of past decisions on a country's present decisions. We include these splines here rather than in the previous model because of the longer time frame, since they are not appropriate for models with a short number of time periods.
noted by current account surpluses and high growth) are also more likely to release PINs. The findings for neighborhood effects are not supported in this longer subsample.
Since inception of the program in 1997, PIN release has basically approximated a global norm. To suggest a similar result for full release of the Article IV reports, however, would be a mistake. Here the release rates by region are much more heterogenous and many of the regions that are transparent with respect to PINs are not with respect to the full Article IV staff reports. This is shown in the table below.
TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE
The reason why there is less transparency about staff reports compared to PINs is arguably attributable to their content. Whereas the PIN is a brief press release written to summarize the Executive Board's deliberations on a country, the staff report is the document that the Executive Board actually sees. Not only is this more detailed in terms of the amount of information, the tone is also very different, as staff reports are more likely to be more pointed in diagnosing the problems that a country faces as well as possible solutions. The 2009 Article IV staff report on Greece, for example, called attention to the urgency of fiscal consolidation, the lack of political consensus within the country, and data weaknesses suggesting that the data that were provided to the Fund were inadequate to the task of helping the national authorities adopt appropriate policies. Less than a year later, the country was borrowing from the IMF as the economic crisis Because the pilot period was not even 24 full months, this has important consequences for the estimation strategy. We present two models below, initially controlling for regional effects by looking at the lagged PIN release percentage rather than the lagged report release percentage.
Simply put, including a variable for lagged report release would cut the number of observations down to approximately 92. Thus, we also present a standard logit model (covering the year 2000 only) in which we include the lagged regional report release variable. Note that because this is a one year snapshot, there are no cross-sectional controls.
These results appear in the table below.
TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE
What do these findings suggest? As with the previous models, we see a strong link between democracy and participation in the Article IV pilot program. Controlling for all other variables, democratic countries were more likely to participate in the pilot program. We also found a link between economic variables and transparency, as wealthier countries were more likely to participate in the pilot program. We saw no link between IMF programs and country participation in the Article IV pilot program.
The role of regional effects here is contingent. The first model (in the middle column of 
TABLE FIVE ABOUT HERE
As this table suggests, countries that are more democratic are more likely to release PINs compared to their counterparts. The coefficient for the lagged Polity2 score is appropriately signed and significant at a .05 level. Holding all other variables constant, moving the country from a nondemocracy to a fully democratic country increased the probability that it would release a staff report by 20%. Thus, the previous findings regarding the effect of democracy on country decisions to release PINs hold here for staff reports as well.
We also see evidence of a neighborhood effect here as well. The variable for lagged regional staff report release percentage is positive and statistically significant at a .01 level. Holding the other variables constant, changing the regional release percentage from its minimum to its maximum value increases the probability that a country will release a staff report by 60%.
We also some evidence of the effects of the economic control variables as well. The variable for GDP per capita was positive and statistically significant at a .01 level, suggesting that wealthier countries are more likely to be transparent. Holding the other variables constant, changing country wealth from its minimum to maximum values increases the probability that a country releases a staff report by 60%. The lagged current account balance was not statistically significant. Growth, on the other hand, was statistically significant, suggesting that countries that are growing faster are more transparent, though this coefficient is only significant at a .10 level.
In other words, there appears to be no difference in the probability between countries with current account surpluses and deficits, but there is weak evidence that differences in transparency exist between slow and fast growing countries, and strong evidence for differences in transparency between wealthy and poor countries.
In Tables One and Two, We might be making too much of this story, though. One explanation for this finding might simply have to do with reporting. The Fund has bundled quarterly program reviews as well as letters of intent with the Article IV process, so it's difficult to say whether this represents leverage or bookkeeping. Notably, a count of the total number of years that a country was under IMF adjustment programs was not statistically significant. Future analysis of this question will focus more on money flows from the IMF to address this problem and clarify the mechanism.
In terms of robustness checks, this model was reestimated with a set of year dummies to control for the trend, cubic splines to control for duration dependence, and regional dummies to further control for differences in release rates between regions. Taken together, the year dummies were statistically significant at a .05 level, and the reported results were unchanged. A set of cubic splines (following Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1997) were statistically significant, indicating duration dependence. With the addition of the cubic splines, the reported coefficients remained appropriately signed and significant. Substantively, the presence of duration dependence tells us that a country's decision to release a staff report at time 1 is shaped by its decision to release or not during the previous consultation. Unlike the second model for PIN release presented above, here regional dummies were statistically significant. The only individual regional dummy that was statistically significant was Latin America, which was negative and statistically significant at a .05 level. The regional dummies collectively were insignificant as a group. The main results were unchanged after we controlled for regional distinctions.
Finally, we attempted additional tests adding variables for lagged trade/GDP, as well as variables for the countries' exchange rate and capital account openness. In no cases were these additional regressors significant. The addition of each of these additional regressors did not change the findings on democracy, GDP per capita, or regional report release, but the lagged IMF program variable was now no longer significant at a .05 level in a model controlling for the country's exchange rate regime..
Summarizing the findings for this test on Article IV staff reports, we see strong evidence in support of a link between democracy and transparency, and strong evidence suggesting that regional effects are at work in shaping country choices regarding transparency. We found some evidence for economic variables, and some evidence suggesting a role for IMF adjustment programs in shaping country choices for or against greater transparency.
An Extension: Moving To (or From) Article IV Transparency
A recap of the findings is in order. The dependent variable is whether or not a country releases the findings of its Article IV consultation with the Fund -and this is measured dichotomously whether we are talking about PINs or Staff Reports. We've found that democracies are more likely to be transparent, and that regional pressures matter; countries in regions wherein data is released themselves have a higher probability of data release. We've also found that economic variables matter and that IMF programs can affect the incidence of staff report release.
A skeptic could claim that what we've done here is a bit of methodological sleight of hand. Since the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if a country releases data, we can't tell from this if that represents the first release following a long period of non-transparency, or the tenth release in a pattern of transparency. This has important implications for the claims we advance here. If domestic political factors don't make countries transparent in the first place, then it is much harder to assess the broader theoretical implications. Thus, this is a methodological issue with theoretical implications. The democratic transitions scholarship (Przeworski et al 2000; Boix and Stokes 2003) takes special pains to distinguish the factors that produce democracies from the factors that sustain democracies. This research offers a strategy moving forward.
The model used in this work is known as a dynamic logit (Amemiya 1985) , so called because it allows to assess the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable through case selection. Essentially, it means estimating the model on the dependent variable first for all of the cases in which the dependent variable equals zero for the prior year, and then estimating the model for all of the cases in which the dependent variable equals one for the prior year. The results for the first equation, then, tell us about the determinants of moving from nontransparency to transparency, and the second tells us about the factors that sustain transparency (by moving from transparency to transparency).
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This is a helpful strategy since it better aligns the hypotheses with the data, but it has one complication compared to the empirical scholarship on democratic transitions. Simply put, the What weve done is estimate a dynamic logit using the three explanations that seem to be most essential in this project (democracy, regional pressure, and IMF programs). 11 The dependent variable is report release, which makes sense because there's much more variation in 10 By extension, then, this can also be interpreted as the factors that cause countries to move from transparency to non-transparency. 11 The non-findings on economic variables on report release noted in Table Five not an artifice of operationalization (Przeworski's dichotomous measure produces the same result), nor is it an artifice of model specification, as the finding is robust when we control for GDP per capita. In other words, controlling for differences in cross-national wealth does not alter the link between democracy and Article IV report transparency. Changing a country from a nondemocracy to a democracy (from minimum to maximum Polity2 score, ceteris paribus) increases the probability that reports are initially released by 31%. Moving this score also increases the probability that reports are released in subsequent years by 19%. Again, democracy matters not merely in the move to transparency, but also in the emergence of transparency as an equilibrium policy.
At the same time, we see support for regional dynamics here as well. Countries in a region with other transparent countries do face pressures to emulate their policies. Holding everything else constant, moving a non-transparent country from a non-transparent region (such as Sub-Saharan Africa in 2000) to a region comprised of transparent countries (such as the OECD) increases the probability that a country releases a report by 35%. While we see important convergence pressures across regions in adopting a standard of report transparency, it does not hold over time. Because it's not significant in the remain transparent model, this tells us that the influence of these external pressures is not constant over time. Country decisions to remain transparent seem to be more powerfully explained by domestic rather than systemic factors. In a sense, this finding resembles the norm life-cycle model suggested by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) . Over time as a norm instantiates within regions, it takes on a taken-for-granted quality.
Importantly, this model was estimated with regional dummy variables for Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Countries in Latin America were less likely to release reports (in other words, either become or remain transparent) and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were less likely to remain transparent. Put another way, the average duration of transparency was shorter in this part of the world compared to other regions. More work on unpacking these regional dynamics is essential to move forward.
Summary of Findings
Across the empirical tests, we can summarize the findings in the table below and Garrett (2008:19-20) suggest that this can only be a preliminary test of a competition argument, since we're not linking the transparency choices of a state to the choices of its trade or capital competitors. This is an area in which more research is needed.
Turning to emulation, this argument suggests that countries simply imitate their neighbors, which would account for the positive findings that we've seen for regional PIN and staff report release. However, the mechanism underpinning emulation seems a little thin -and to be fair, we're limited about how we can test this using the data that we presently have. One empirical test on emulation, though, bears noting. Shipan and Volden (2008) , in their study of municipal choices to adopt anti-smoking policy, suggest that the effects of emulation are largely short-term.
In their model, cities are solely looking at what their neighbors are doing and are responding reactively rather than developing independent research about the effects of anti-smoking ordinances in their own community. As a result, Shipan and Volden suggest that the size of the substantive effect of emulation should be rather short-lived compared to other mechanisms. This insight might prove helpful as this project moves forward.
Reestimating these models with a different measure of regional release seems to provide some clarity. Recalculating the release percentage as the percentage of bordering states (ala Simmons and Elkins 2004) , we note the following. Release percentage operationalized in terms of contiguity is appropriately signed and statistically significant in all of the models but the dynamic logit. It is significant in the second model of PIN release (where regional release percentage was no longer significant), though it does not appear that decisions to release staff reports or remain releasing staff reports is driven by the behavior of bordering states. Future research will investigate the behavior of key trading partners to better unpack this mechanism.
A similar challenge awaits us for ascertaining if learning is accounting for this result. Simmons, Dobbins, and Garrett (2008:29) 
Further Implications
Quite obviously, this is the first step in a much larger project, and there is a great deal more to be done here to understand the evolution of transparency in IMF surveillance. Future directions in this project are two-fold: developing a better understanding of regional distinctions and assessing the broader implications for themes in IPE scholarship. We address each in turn.
Not all regions in this project are the same. One of the findings in the staff report model was that controlling for all other variables, countries in Latin America are significantly less likely to release staff reports. Future work will require a more in-depth analysis of Latin American countries to understand why a region with so many democracies still experiences such a low degree of transparency. 
